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Article 5

Prison Interviews: The Movement Toward
Expanded Rights
I. Introduction
The first amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
fundamental rights of free speech and freedom of the press. A precise definition
of these rights has proved elusive, however, as they continually evolve to meet the
demands of changing needs and emerging problems. This note will examine the
current status of first amendment rights as they relate specifically to prisoners'
rights of access to the press and press' rights of access to prisoners.
The basic issue in the current cases is whether face-to-face interviews
between prisoners and the media should be allowed. This question necessarily
involves a twofold analysis. First, is the prisoner's constitutional right abridged
by denying him direct access to the press, and second, is the freedom of the press
effectively denied by prohibiting individual inmate interviews?
The question from the prisoner's perspective is complicated by the uncertain status of the constitutional rights of inmates during lawful incarceration.
Certain limitations on personal liberties are inherent in the prison system. These
limitations are necessary if incarceration is to fulfill its rehabilitative and deterrent functions. Further, these restrictions are required to insure safety in the
prisons. Nevertheless, a prisoner does not lose all constitutional rights during
incarceration, although the permissible scope of limitations on personal liberties
is not easily defined.
Concomitant with the prisoners' rights of access to the press is the press'
right of access to information within the prison. The constitutional protection of
the press clearly includes the right to print known information. Whether the
press has a right of access to sources of information, however, is not certain.
This question must be resolved in light of the media responsibility to keep the
public informed.
II. Prisoners' Rights
A. The Evolution of Treatment in the Courts
Prison regulations prohibiting media interviews with inmates are being
challenged by prisoners on first amendment grounds. The basis of the prisoners'
complaint is that a ban on all press interviews unnecessarily limits their rights of
free speech. Whether this limitation is permissible is the question that comes
before the courts.
The traditional method of analysis in prisoners' rights cases was evidenced
by judicial reluctance to consider prisoners' constitutional claims. Questions of
this nature were generally left to the discretion of the prison administrator as
matters of internal control.' The justification for this approach was found in the
1

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2nd Cir. 1971)

("The federal court
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"Loss of Rights Model"' which courts used in examining prisoners' rights. The
essence of this model was the theory that lawful incarceration brings about the
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, and that this retraction
was justified by considerations underlying the prison system.
Although a prisoner no longer enjoys the same free exercise of his constitutional rights as he did prior to incarceration, he by no means loses all his rights at
the prison gates.' This realization caused a gradual erosion in the "Loss of
Rights Model." The emphasis of the courts began to shift from the retraction
of prisoners' rights to the necessity of limitations on them. The modern approach
is characterized by the "Retention of Rights Model" developed by the Sixth
Circuit in Coffin v. Reichards.' Under this doctrine a prisoner retains the rights
of an ordinary citizen except those which are expressly or by necessary implication taken from him. As the court in Coffin stated, "While the law does take his
liberty and imposes on him a duty of servitude and observance of discipline for his
regulation and that of other prisoners, it does not deny his rights to personal
security against unlawful invasion." 5
The evolution of these theories is reflected not only in the standard applied
in analysis of the constitutional questions involved, but also in the change in the
willingness of the courts to hear cases involving prisoners' rights. The courts have
slowly moved from a "hands-off" posture to a more traditional approach to
constitutional issues.'
Early cases evidenced traces of the "hands-off" doctrine in the judicial
reluctance to tamper with prison administrative policy. 7 This tendency is typified
by the statement that "correctional authorities have wide discretion in matters
of internal administration and that reasonable action within the scope of this
discretion does not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights."' The Second
Circuit espoused an even stricter approach, holding that federal courts should
interfere with prison administration only in the "most extreme cases involving
a shocking deprivation of fundamental rights."' The courts feared that a receptive attitude toward prisoners' claims would encourage prisoners to take any
grievance to the federal court for redress, thus effectively creating a prison board
refuses to interfere with internal state prison administration except in the most extreme cases involving a shocking deprivation of fundamental rights." As the court stated, to do otherwise
"would encourage prisoners who have any kind of 'beef' to seek redress in the federal courts,
and the courts will end up sitting as prison boards of discipline"). Carswell v. Wainwright, 413
F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The federal courts interfere in the internal operation and administration of prison systems only in extreme cases"). See also Beard v. Lee, 396 F.2d 749
(5th Cir. 1968).
2 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
3 See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1972); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
4 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
5 Id. at 445.
6 For an example of this, see the series of cases involving censorship of prisoners' mail.
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 672 (2nd Cir. 1972) (clear and present
danger); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 188 (2nd Cir. 1971) (justified by considerations
underlying our penal system); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 540 (5th Cir. 1968)
(compelling state interest) ; McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964) (handsoff posture).
7 See, e.g., Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 '(8th Cir. 1952).
8 Beard v. Lee, 396 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1968).
9 Adams v. Carlson, 451 F.2d 730, 732 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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of discipline in the courts. A development of this nature would hamper prison
administration and unnecessarily crowd the court docket.
In recent years, many courts have adopted a more liberal view of the scope
of prisoners' rights resulting in a greater willingness to review prisoner grievance
cases." This attitude was reflected in the Fifth Circuit's statement in Fox v.
Sullivan11 that, "However reluctant the federal courts may be to interfere with
the administration of state prisons by state officials, they may not avoid the
determination of whether rights protected by the Constitution have been
violated."1
This shift from the "hands-off" posture has led to a more rigorous analysis
of the nature of the prison system. "No longer can prisons and their inmates be
considered a closed society with every internal disciplinary judgment to be blissfully regarded as immune from the limelight that all public agencies ordinarily
are subject to."' 3 The current status thus reflects both greater willingness on
the part of the courts to hear cases involving constitutional claims of prisoners
and an increased effort to afford prisoners the constitutional guarantees of free
citizens to the greatest possible extent.
B. Recent Case Developments
Most of the recent prisoners' rights cases have involved the question of faceto-face interviews with the media. The prison policies in question generally
prohibit press interviews with individual inmates. The former federal policy,
which is prototypical of several current state policies, 4 had been delineated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons as follows:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates.
This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview.
However, conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not
to be made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities,
programs, and activities."5
Restrictive policies of this nature were adopted in response to prison unrest
which was blamed in part on the "celebrity" status 0 attained by prisoners who
were singled out for press interviews. The prison administrators justified these
policies chiefly on the grounds that they would enhance security and prison
morale by eliminating "celebrities."
The prisoners' objection is that the regulations limit their access to the press
and thus restrict their freedom of speech. Although the constitutional right of
free speech has never been held to embrace a right to require journalists to pub10 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Finney v. Ark. Bd. of Corrections,
505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Clements v. Turner, 364 F.Supp. 270 (D. Utah 1973).
11 539 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1976).
12 Id. at 1066.
13 Wright v. McMann, 321 F.Supp. 127 (N.D. N.Y. 1970).
14 California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Virginia, Wisconsin.
15 FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Policy Statement 1220.1A, Para. 4b(6) (Feb. 11,
1972).
16 For a discussion of the problem of "celebrity" status in prisons, see Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 831-32 (1974).
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lish an individual's views," under certain circumstances the right of free speech
includes the right to communicate to a willing listener, including a representative
of the press who may wish to publish the information."8 The Supreme Court
9
focused on this dilemma in Pell v. Procunier."
1. The Pell Analysis
In Pell, journalists and state prison inmates brought actions in the United
States District Court attacking the constitutionality of a state regulation" prohibiting face-to-face interviews between media representatives and individual
inmates. A three-judge district court granted the inmates' motion for summary
judgment, holding that their first amendment rights had been unconstitutionally
infringed. 2 ' The Supreme Court reversed on appeal.22
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that incarceration necessarily
limits many privileges and rights, but that a prison inmate retains those rights
which are not inconsistent with his prisoner status or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. These basic objectives are the
deterrence of crime, the rehabilitation of criminals, and the internal security of
the prison.
The Court then examined the regulation and its method of restricting
prisoner communication in the light of alternative means of communication
available. Although alternative methods of communication do not altogether
extinguish a constitutional claim,22 the Court found that they do constitute a
relevant factor when balancing the prisoners' rights against the competing governmental interests. Prisoners have a variety of alternative means available, including uncensored communication by mail, which embraces communication
with media representatives, and other personal contacts through whom the
prisoners may indirectly communicate with the press. These personal contacts
include family, attorneys, clergy, and friends allowed to visit under the Corrections Department policy.
The challenged regulation was then analyzed in light of the valid prison
objectives and the alternative means of communication available to the prisoners.
The Court stressed the obvious necessity for some regulations in the prison context
and stated that deference would be given to the administrative decisions made
in promulgating the regulations absent some showing of abuse by prison administrators. In the instant case, the Court found that the regulations involved did
not abridge the first amendment freedoms retained by the inmates and therefore were not unconstitutional.
17

Assoc. & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); Chicago

19

Id.

Joint Bd., Amal. Cloth. Wkrs. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1970); Avins v. Rutgers, St. Univ. of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd
Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1967).
18 417 U.S. at 822.
20

CALIFORMNA DEPARTMENT OF CoPREcTIONs MANUAL,

§ 415.071 provides that "press

and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted."

21
22
23

Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F.Supp. 196 (N.D. Ca. 1973).
417 U.S. 817.
Id. at 822-23.
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Although the Court in Pell sustained the challenged regulation of prisoner
interviews, four justices strongly dissented.24 The thrust of the dissent was that
the regulation was a grossly overbroad restriction on the prisoners' speech and
thus constituted an impermissible burden on their first amendment rights. The
dissent conceded that some regulation may be necessary to maintain security, discipline, and good order. The absolute ban, however, unnecessarily exceeded
those needs. In the area of first amendment rights, this excess is fatal, for "broad
prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. . . . Precision of
regulation must be the touchstone in an area so clearly touching our most
precious freedoms." 5 Since the necessity for a total ban had not been shown, and
since less restrictive means of regulation were clearly available, the dissent argued
that the regulation should have been found unconstitutional.26
2. Other Judicial Decisions
There have been few other recent decisions directly on the issue of prisoners'
rights, but two decisions merit discussion in that they reflect the dichotomy
between the majority and minority approaches taken in Pell.
In Finney v. Arkansas,17 the Eighth Circuit followed the minority approach
in Pell and balanced the propriety of limitations on prisoner correspondence
against the prisoners' rights to free speech.2" While recognizing the valid administrative interests involved, the court nevertheless struck down the regulation
as an impermissible intrusion into the area of first amendment freedoms. The
court stated that "If the prison officials have a valid interest in investigating the
potential visitors, obviously that interest may
be protected by less intrusive means,
29
such as the submission of a visitors' list."
By way of contrast, the district court in Mitford v. Pickett"0 held that prison
regulations limiting personal interviews of inmates by the press were valid since
they were concerned with the internal affairs of the prison. Thus, the court
found that the regulations did not deny inmates their right to free speech under
the first amendment at least where inmates and the press were afforded ample
opportunity to correspond by mail.
3. Analysis of Recent Case Law Developments
Although the Court in Pell applied a balancing test which purported to
recognize the prisoners' first amendment rights, it did not realistically weigh the
24 Mr. Justice Powell, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice
Marshall dissented. The dissent in Pell is discussed further in the text accompanying note
50 infra.
25 417 U.S. at 838 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972)).
26 See the discussion of available alternative methods in text accompanying notes 68-86
infra.
27 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
28 The regulations involved limited prisoner correspondence to persons who previously
consented to the contact. Thus the procedure affected potential correspondence whenever a
prison official refused permission to include a name on the approved correspondence list.
29 505 F.2d at 211.
30 363 F.Supp. 975 (E.D. Ill. 1973). The regulations involved broadly prohibited interviews with Federal prisoners to safeguard their privacy.

[Vol. 54:288]

NOTES

implications of the limitations imposed. The Court stressed alternative methods
of communication available to the prisoners in justifying the prohibition of faceto-face media interviews. This approach, however, shifts the focus away from the
actual issue, which is the permissibility of the ban on these interviews. The question is not whether there are alternative means of communication available, but
rather whether prohibiting individual interviews impermissibly denies the prisoners their first amendment rights.
In addition, the Court failed to consider that the alternative means of communication do not adequately compensate for the value of personal interviews.
Many factors, such as demeanor, tone, and reaction, enter into a personal
contact and are lost when the interview is forced from a personal level to a
secondhand basis. Further, it is practically impossible to follow up on matters
or pursue sidelines of interest when the interview is not face to face.
Finally, less restrictive alternatives are available to accomplish the purposes
of these regulations. Instead of an outright ban on personal interviews, prison
policies could be developed which would allow interviews on a limited basis.
Prisoners' eligibility for interviews could be determined by their overall prison
record. Media qualifications could be determined by their credentials. The
problems of "celebrity" inmates could be overcome by limiting the number of
interviews permissible in a given time span. Less restrictive regulations are quite
feasible, yet the Court failed to require that the least restrictive method of
regulation be employed.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement recently issued" could
serve as a valuable guideline to less restrictive methods of regulation. The new
policy recognizes the desirability of establishing a system which affords the public
greater access to news about prison operation. In so doing it establishes an
interview policy whereby either prisoners or media may apply for an interview,
and the warden of the prison may, in his discretion, either grant or deny the interview. The adoption of a policy of this nature would lead to a more flexible administrative procedure which would adequately protect the prisoners' first
amendment freedoms.
III. Press' Rights
A. Evolution of Treatment in the Courts
Regulations prohibiting inmate interviews are frequently challenged by the
media as a violation of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.
The media claim focuses on the press' rights of access to information, an emerging aspect of first amendment freedom which defies precise definition.
The press is afforded special protection under the first amendment to accommodate the particular function which it serves. The press is viewed by the
courts as an agency of the public,"2 and is given special protection in an effort to
secure the public right to know. The function of the press is to keep the public
31
32

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Policy Statement 1220.1B (July 1, 1976).

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork, 370 F.Supp. 1135 (D. Mass. 1974).
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informed. Thus the press has the duty to disseminate to the public at large the
news which it can reliably assemble."
The question then arises whether a coexistent right to gather information
exists. The existence of a right to gather information was first suggested by the
Supreme Court in Zemel v. Rusk. 4 In Zemel the plaintiff argued that the denial
of a passport violated his right of free speech by denying him the opportunity to
become better acquainted with foreign affairs. The Court avoided addressing this
issue directly by stating that the restriction involved was an inhibition of action
rather than one of speech, and decided the case on that basis. Still, the suggestion remained that there was some existing right to inform oneself, and that
this right could be asserted in a proper case.
Whether a coexistent right to gather information exists was directly addressed in subsequent cases. In Associated Press v. United States 5 the Supreme
Court specifically stated that "the right to speak and publish does not carry with
it the unrestrained right to gather information."3 Although the Court made
it clear that the media does not possess an "unrestrained" right to gather information, it did not define the extent of the right that is constitutionally cognizable.
The Supreme Court did refine its analysis of the extent of press rights in
Branzburg v. Hayes.17 Branzburg involved the question of whether reporters
were privileged from revealing news sources in grand jury investigations. In
refusing to recognize any special media privilege, the Court stressed that "the
First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special
access to information not available to the public generally." 38
The Branzburg doctrine has been repeatedly applied in cases finding that
members of the press are not constitutionally guaranteed a right of access greater
that that afforded to the general public, 9 although a strong dissent on this issue
has developed in recent cases.4" In applying this logic to the prison cases, the
question is whether the ban placed on press interviews of prisoners denies the
freedom of the press. In answering this negatively, the courts stress that prisons
are institutions where public access in general is limited.4
Since, under
Branzburg, the press has no right of special access beyond that afforded the public
generally, denying individual interviews to the press does not constitute an impermissible burden on the freedom of the press.
B. Recent Case Developments
Three recent lower court decisions reflect the variety of results possible under
33 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill
385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
34 381 U.S. 1 (1965).

35

326 U.S. 1 (1945).

36

Id. at 17.

37

408 U.S. 665 (1972).

38 Id. at 684.
39 See, e.g., Watson v. Cronin, 384 F.Supp. 652 (D. Colo. 1974); U.S. v. Mitchell, 386
F.Supp. 639 (D. D.C. 1974).
40 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. The Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843 (1974); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); U.S. v. Mitchell, 386 F.Supp. 639
(D. D.C. 1974).
41 Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966).
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the Branzburg method of analysis. In Mitford v. Pickett,4 an Illinois District
Court, following the traditional methodology, held that the inmate interview regulations did not infringe on the first amendment rights of freedom of the press
since prison interview policies were internal affairs properly regulated by prison
administrators.
The Ninth Circuit, in Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild Local #82 v.
Parker,4 required closer scrutiny of the regulations involved than was given in
Mitford. In Seattle-Tacoma, the court also held that the interview regulations
were within the scope of official discretion in the administration of a federal prison,
but carefully reviewed the regulation to ensure that it did not unduly restrict the
flow of information to the public. The court relied on the fact that alternative
means of communication were available; members of the press had extensive
access to facilities and personnel in addition to unlimited rights to confidential
correspondence.
In McMillan v. Carlson,4 4 however, a Massachusetts District Court reached
a radically different result. The court there held that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons' total ban on personal interviews by authors was unconstitutional as an
invalid restriction of first amendment rights regardless of the alternative written
correspondence that was allowed. In McMillan, the plaintiff, who was writing a
biography of James Earl Ray,4 was barred from interviewing Ray's brother while
he was an inmate in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.
The court found that the regulation was unconstitutional and ordered the prison
to grant the plaintiff permission to confidentially interview the prisoner.
In reaching this decision, the court first found newsgathering to be within
the ambit of the first amendment protection as a corollary of the right to publish.
The court further found that the public has a constitutional right to receive information and ideas which the regulations in question unreasonably restricted.
The court then held that the burden was on the Bureau of Prisons to justify the
restraints on this information, and that the Bureau had failed to sustain this
burden. Further, the court found it unreasonable to treat all authors or inmates
alike in denying interviews, particularly when distinctions could rationally be
drawn. Thus, the ban was an unreasonable restriction of first amendment rights.
4
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases, Pell v. Procunier
and Saxbe v. The
Washington Post Co., reaffirmed the Court's holding in Branzburg and denied
media claims of first amendment violations based on prisoner-press interview
prohibitions. Both of these decisions, however, contained strong dissents which
argued in favor of the media claim.
In Pell v. Procunier,s the Court examined the media defendants' claims
that the California state prison regulation 4 prohibiting individual inmate interviews infringed upon their first amendment rights. The defendant members of
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

363 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ill. 1973).
480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973).
369 F.Supp. 1182 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1217 (1974).
James Earl Ray was the assassin of Martin Luther King.
417 U.S. 817.
417 U.S. 843 (1974).
417 U.S. 817.
See note 20 supra.
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the press contended that, in the absence of an individualized determination that
the particular interview might create a clear and present danger to prison
security or to some other substantial interest served by the corrections system,
they had a constitutional right to interview any inmate who was willing to speak
with them."
In rejecting this claim, the Court focused on the justification for the prohibition and on the other avenues of access available to newsmen. The Court
particularly noted that the regulation was not an attempt to conceal prison conditions or to frustrate press investigation of those conditions, as newsmen are
accorded the opportunity to enter the prison and interview inmates randomly
selected by corrections officials. Rather, the policy prohibited individual interviews in an effort to advance prison security and morale.
The regulation involved in Pell was developed in response to mounting
disciplinary problems in San Quentin and other state prisons. Part of the disciplinary problem was blamed on the liberal posture toward press interviews.
The regulation sought to eliminate the prison "celebrity" phenomenon which
resulted from the concentration of attention on individual inmates. The press
contended that the regulation suffered from overbreadth. The majority of the
Court upheld the regulation, following the Branzburg rationale that the press had
no special right of access to information.
Four justices dissented from the majority holding on the media claim in
Pell." The crux of Mr. Justice Powell's separate dissent was that the absolute
interview ban impermissibly restrained the ability of the press to perform its
constitutionally protected function of informing the people of the conduct of
the government. 2 In addition, the other dissenting justices emphasized the
traditional role of the press of informing the public, and then looked at the
regulation in light of the scope of its effect on that function. The thrust of their
argument was that a complete ban goes beyond what is necessary for prison
security and policy objectives and infringes upon the cherished right of a free
press.53
In Saxbe v. The Washington Post Co.,54 a companion case to Pell, newsmen
challenged a Federal Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 5 prohibiting interviews
between newsmen and individually designated inmates of the federal prisons.
The majority, citing to their analysis in Pell, found that the press had no special
right of access, and therefore the media's first amendment rights were not
abridged by the regulation.
Three justices dissented in Saxbe again focusing on the absolute nature of
the interview ban and the corresponding effect of the ban on the press."0
Specifically, the dissent focused on the aspects of a personal interview which are
lost in substituting correspondence or secondhand contacts for news sources.
The dissent noted that this deficiency was critical to the news media, since
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

417 U.S. at 829.
See note 24 supra.
417 U.S. at 835.
Id. at 840.
417 U.S. 843.
See note 15 supra.
Mr. Justice Powell, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall dissented.
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"Ethical newsmen are reluctant to publish a story without an opportunity
through face-to-face discussion to evaluate the veracity and reliability of its
source." 7 The prevalence of functional illiteracy among inmate populations
poses serious difficulties if the press must rely on written communications for its
sources."8 Further, reliance on random interviews is an inadequate substitution
for personal contact since randomly selected prisoners are often not qualified to
speak on the topic at issue. 9
In analyzing the issue of the press' rights of access to sources of information,
the dissent, like the majority, looked to the Zemel and Branzburg precedents, but
distinguished both cases. The majority concluded from these opinions that nondiscriminatory restrictions on press access to information are constitutionally acceptable, but the dissent differed on this point. In analyzing Zemel, the dissent
found the Court's distinction between inhibition of action and restraint of speech
to be too uncertain a dichotomy to be effective in deciding the present question
as interviews necessarily entail both conduct and speech.
Similarly, the dissent failed to find the Branzburg rationale convincing:
It is true, of course, that the Branzburg decision rejected an argument
grounded in the assertion of a First Amendment right to gather news and
that the opinion contains language which, when read in isolation, may be
read to support the majority's view. . . . Taken in its entirety, however,
Branzburg does not endorse so sweeping a rejection of First Amendment
challenges to restraints on access to news. The Court did not hold that the
government is wholly free to restrict press access to newsworthy information. To the contrary, we recognized explicitly that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press does extend to some of the antecedent activities
that make the right to publish meaningful: "Nor is it suggested that news
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." 60
In distinguishing Zemel and Branzburg, the dissent contended that a point
exists beyond which official restraints on news sources undermine the first amendment. At that point the government must justify such regulations in terms of a
compelling interest rather than asserting its discretionary authority.
The dissent then analyzed the government's justifications for the regulation
in light of the substantial interest test announced in Procunier v. Martinez"' as
the standard to be applied in dealing with first amendment liberties.6 2 Applying
this test in Saxbe, the dissent found the Bureau's justifications unpersuasive in
light of the heavy burden of this standard.
The dissent also emphasized the empirical evidence relating to prisoner-press
57 417 U.S. at 854.
58 Id. at 854-55.
59 Id. at 855.
60 Id. at 859.
61 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
62 In Procunier,the Court stated the applicable standard as follows: "First, the regulation
or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. . . . Second, the limitation of First Amendment
freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved." 416 U.S. at 413.
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interviews gathered in a survey of other prison systems. This data substantiated
the dissent's contention that less restrictive means of regulating prisoner interviews were available. Of the twenty-four American jurisdictions in the sample,
only five broadly prohibited personal interviews of inmates,"3 whereas seven
vested authority in correctional authorities to allow or deny the interviews on a
case-by-case basis, 4 and eleven generally permitted the interviews.6" In analyzing
the data the dissent concluded that there was no compelling reason to adopt a
blanket prohibition.
Thus, the dissent stressed the merits of a case-by-case evaluation policy.
Such an evaluation would meet the needs of the prison authorities while avoiding
the first amendment hazards of a policy which broadly denies access to prisoners
for individual interviews.
The options available to the Bureau of Prisons in formulating a workable
policy were considered by the dissent. 6 Reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of interviews would clearly be enforceable. Further, to overcome the prisoner "celebrity" phenomenon the dissent suggested limiting the
number of interviews of an inmate in a time span while making eligibility for
interviews contingent upon an acceptable prison conduct record. Finally, the
dissent noted that an emergency power to suspend all interviews could be retained
by the prisons in order to deal with extraordinary situations.
The analysis of the majority of the Court parallels that used in its examination of prisoners' first amendment claims in conjunction with the same regulation,
and thus suffers from the same infirmity. The Court stressed the justifications for
the regulation and alternative means of communication available, but it avoided
addressing the issue of whether the regulations involved unconstitutionally infringe upon the first amendment guarantees of freedom of the press.
The regulations involved do infringe on the press' ability to inform the
public, for they limit any access on an individual basis to sources of information
in prison. Since these regulations restrict the first amendment freedom of the
press, the government should bear the burden of justifying the limitations by
showing a compelling state interest which necessitates regulation." Absent this
justification, the regulation should be held to constitute an impermissible burden
on the freedom of the press.
The Court sidestepped this analysis by finding that the press had no constitutionally protected right to access to information. It emphasized the contention that the press' rights of access to information were no greater than that
afforded the public generally. Thus, antecedent newsgathering activities are not
within the ambit of first amendment protection.
Strict adherence to this approach dilutes the impact of the first amendment
protection of freedom of the press. Press activities are protected to insure an
informed public, and to effectively retain this safeguard some protection must
63
64
65
Iowa,
66
67

See note 14 supra.
Alaska, Georgia, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina.
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont,
New York City, and the District of Columbia.
417 U.S. at 871-74.
See note 62 supra.
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be given to antecedent newsgathering activities. If not, certain newsworthy
topics would be essentially removed from the scope of media coverage. Such is
the case when all interviews of individual inmates are prohibited. Prison conditions may still be reported, but those conditions are not the only newsworthy
activity within the prison. Stories relating to prisoners' lives before incarceration, their impending appeals, and even general public interest stories may be
newsworthy. These other types of subject matter must be afforded some measure
of protection in order to guarantee an informed public. The regulations in
question in Pell deny this protection and should have been found unconstitutional for that reason.
C. Houchins v. KQED, Inc."8 : The Recent Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court recently addressed the propriety of prisoner-press
interview prohibitions in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 9 This case arose when
KQED broadcasting company was refused permission to inspect and take photographs of a portion of a county jail where a prisoner suicide had reportedly occurred. A psychiatrist's report of the suicide had blamed prison conditions for
the death. KQED filed an action against the supervisor of the jail alleging
deprivation of their first amendment rights since prison policy denied all public
access to the jail.
Following the filing of the action, the prison authorities announced a new
program of monthly prison tours open to the public. These tours, however, were
restricted to certain sections of the jail and the use of tape recorders or cameras
was prohibited. In addition, no prisoner interviews were allowed on the tours.
The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiff
based on its finding that the prison policy denied reasonable access to the jail.7"
The court of appeals affirmed this decision. 1 In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case."' Mr. Chief Justice
Burger announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined. The opinion of these
justices rejects the court of appeals' "conclusory assertion that the public and
the media have a first amendment right to government information regarding the
conditions of jails and their inmates and presumably all other facilities such as
hospitals and mental institutions.""3 The Court distinguished the right to publish
information from the right of access to information in order to publish. Citing
the Pell decision,74 the Court held that there was no right of access such as that
relied on by the court of appeals.7 5 Further, questions of access were held to be
68
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69 Id.
70 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a
preliminary injunction restraining the county sheriff from depriving or excluding, as a matter
of general policy, representatives of the news media from the county jail facilities and requiring
that reporters be given access to facilities at reasonable times and that they be allowed to use
photographic and sound equipment to interview inmates.
71 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
72 46 U.S.L.W. 4830.
73 Id. at 4833.
74 417 U.S. 817.
75 46 U.S.L.W. at 4832.
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essentially questions of legislative policy and were better left to legislative reform.
To allow these questions to be decided on Constitutional grounds would set the
first amendment up as a "Freedom of Information Act" and, absent statutory
standards, would lead to an ad hoc approach by the court of appeals according
to their own notions of what was expedient or desirable.76
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion, found that the preliminary injunction issued was unwarranted, and therefore concurred with the judgment of
the Court.7 7 Justice Stewart did, however, find that KQED was entitled to injunctive relief of a more limited scope. Although he agreed that the Constitution
does no more than assure the public and the press equal rights of access once the
government has opened the door, he disagreed with the definition of "equal
access" found in Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Rather than a static view of
"equal access," Justice Stewart urged that a realistic approach to the problem be
adopted which would allow flexibility to accommodate the practical distinctions
between the needs of the press and the general public. He found that the "terms
of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may,
if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable
as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what the
visitors see."' 78 Although KQED should be entitled to some form of injunctive
relief, Justice Stewart found that the relief granted by the district court was
overbroad because it allowed the press access to areas not generally open to the
public and because it allowed random press interviews which were denied to the
public. Justice Stewart contended however that in allowing more effective reporting of subject matter open to the public, injunctive relief would be ap7
propriate.
Three justices dissented asserting that KQED was entitled to the injunctive
relief granted by the district court." Their conclusion was based on the analysis
of the prison regulations in effect at the time the suit was instituted. The regulations prohibited public access to the jail and allowed some censorship of
prisoners' mail." This is not the situation anticipated by the Pell decision for, as
the dissent noted:
The decision in Pell, therefore, does not imply that a state policy of concealing prison conditions from the press, or a policy denying the press any
opportunity to observe those conditions, could have been justified simply
by pointing to like concealment from, and denial to, the general public. If
76 Id. at 4833.
77 Id. at 4834.
78 Id.
79 Suggested improvements would be a more flexible and frequent basis than monthly
scheduled tours and use of cameras and recording equipment be allowed to enable more effective
audience presentation.
80 Mr. Justice Stevens, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Powell.
81 As stated in Houchins:
When this suit was filed, there were no public tours. Petitioner enforced a policy of
virtually total exclusion of both the public and the press from those areas within the
Santa Rita jail where the inmates were confined. At the time petitioner also enforced
a policy of reading all inmate correspondence addressed to persons other than lawyers
and judges and censoring those portions that related to the conduct of the guards who
controlled their daily existence.
46 U.S.L.W. at 4836.
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that were not true, there would have been no need to emphasize 82the substantial press and public access reflected in the record of that case.
The central question in the dissent's analysis was whether the restrictions on
access to the prison in effect on the date the litigation commenced concealed
from the general public the conditions of confinement within the facility and thus
abridged the public's right to be informed about those conditions. KQED's
case was based on the contention that the conditions were wholly without claim
to confidentiality and thus no legitimate penological justification existed for concealing the prison conditions.83 The constitutional issue addressed by the dissent
was whether "an official prison policy of concealing such knowledge from the
public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of information at its sources abridges
the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth
'
Amendments to the Constitution."84
Given this statement of the issue, the dissent held that the injunctive relief
granted was an appropriate remedy. The relief was tailored to the needs of the
litigant, a member of the press. Thus the relief did not consciously grant the
press greater rights of access than those afforded the general public. Rather, the
relief granted was concerned only with the press, as the rights of the general
public were not litigated. Thus the dissenting justices would have affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals.8"
The approach taken in the dissent raised an additional critical factor: the
time which the court must look to in deciding the constitutionality of the regulation. The majority decision emphasized the monthly jail tour and the liberal
communication policy available to the inmates even though these policies were
instituted after the complaint was filed in this action. According to the dissent,
the injunctive relief should be examined in relation to the prior restrictive policies
which essentially limited all access to the prison and sharply abridged free communication by prisoners.86 When considered in that posture, the first amendment
rights in question were abridged and injunctive relief was appropriate. The
form of relief should have met the needs of the litigant, a member of the press,
and should have allowed for reasonable press access. As such, the injunctive
order in question should have been affirmed.
IV. Conclusion
The prisoner and press claims in prisoner interview cases involve overlapping
considerations. Both classes of plaintiffs possess first amendment claims. A
balance must be obtained between these interests and the legitimate prison
interests in security and in advancing correctional objectives. The law is still in
an evolutionary stage in this area. The leading case at present, KQED, Inc. v.
82 46 U.S.L.W. at 4837.
83 This is based on the fact that prisons are public institutions financed by public funds
and administered by public servants. They are an integral part of the criminal justice system
and can greatly affect the rights of citizens confined there.
84 46 U.S.L.W. at 4839.
85 Id. at 4840.
86 Id. at 4836.
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Houchins,1 was a 4-3 decision in which the concurring opinion recognized the
existence of the right in question but disagreed with the remedy granted in the
lower court. It should be noted that this was only a plurality decision,
and that a strong dissent was filed. Thus the Supreme Court decision in the case
reflects the unsettled status still present in this area of case law.
Strong consideration should be given to the factors emphasized by the dissents in Pell v. Procunier8 and Saxbe v. The Washington Post, Inc., 9 as well as
the dissent and concurring opinion in KQED, Inc. First, the court should look
realistically at the implications that a total interview ban has on the newsman's
ability to effectively inform the public. Second, the court should carefully
analyze the alternative means of communication and realize the shortcomings
inherent in them, both from the perspective of the prisoners and of the press.
Finally, the court should assess the scope of the regulation in an effort to determine whether its purpose could be accomplished by less restrictive means.
The court should then require that the least restrictive means of regulation be
utilized, so as to safeguard the first amendment rights of both the prisoners and
the press.
Kathleen M. Gallogly
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